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1 “Islam,” BBC World Service, 2 July, 2004 and Robert Hefner, “Islam and Asian Security,”
Strategic Asia, 2003. For general information on the history of Islam see Karen Armstrong,
Islam: A Short History (New York: The Modern Library, 2002).
2 Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic Not a Monolith, (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2003).
3 “Huge Potential,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21903
Updated February 8, 2005
Islam in South and Southeast Asia
Bruce Vaughn
Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Summary
There exists much diversity within the Islamic world. This is particularly evident
in Asia. This diversity is to be found in the different ethnic backgrounds and in the
different practices of Islam. The Muslim world of Asia has been experiencing an Islamic
revival. This has had an effect on moderate as well as radical Muslims. An
understanding of the dynamics of Islam in Asia should help inform United States’ policy
to develop respect between America and Muslim peoples, to foster economic policies
to encourage development of open societies, to support education in Muslim states, and
to identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries in order to pursue more effectively the war
against terror. This report will be updated.
By some estimates there are approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, of
which 60% live in Asia.1 Only 15% of Muslims are Arab, while almost one third live in
South Asia.2 The four nations with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia (194
million), India (150 million), Pakistan (145 million), and Bangladesh (130 million), are
in Asia. China also has a population of 39 million Muslims.3 Despite this, the Muslims
of Asia are perceived to be on the periphery of the Islamic core based in the Arab Middle
East. Muslims are a majority in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan in
Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in South Asia and Malaysia, Brunei,
and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. (See map below) There are also significant minority
populations in Khazakstan, India, Thailand, and the Philippines. Sizable Muslim
communities are also found in Sri Lanka, China, Burma, and Singapore.
CRS-2
4 Islam has been defined as “the Arabic word meaning “surrender”or “submission,” as in
surrendering to God’s will.” Gregorian, p. 6.
5 V. Cieslak and C. Mark, “Islam/U.S. Ethnic Populations: Frequently Asked
Questions/Statistics,” Congressional Research Service, Electronic Terrorism Briefing Book.
6 Hefner, p. 353 & Angel Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and
Terrorists, Adelphi Paper 358, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, p.10-12.
7 See CRS Report RS21432, Islam: A Primer, C. Mark, CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and
Shiites, F. Armanios, and CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and
Salafiyya, F. Armanios.
Islam4 is by some estimates the world’s fastest growing religion. Mecca, in Saudi
Arabia, is the spiritual center of Islam because Mohammad founded the religion there in
610. In 2002, Muslims constituted approximately 19% of the world’s population as
compared to 30% that were Christian. These percentages are projected by some to shift
to 25% Christian and 30% Muslim by the year 2025.5
Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the
Middle East. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast
Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as
it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on
animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more
syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the
seventeenth century. Islam in Asia is more politically diverse than in the Middle East.
Islam has been undergoing a revival in Asia. RAND analyst Angel Rabasa points
to several factors that contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. These include both
domestic and external factors. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of
Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and
resulting urbanization. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 resulted in the overthrow of the
authoritarian Suharto regime and created political space for Islamists in Indonesia.
Muslim separatist insurgents have continued their struggle in the Philippines and Thailand
while the Parti Islam se Malaysia has worked through the political system to promote an
Islamist agenda while in opposition in Malaysia. External factors include the current
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1979 Islamic revolution
in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism, the conflict
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the Afghan war against the Soviets.6
Different Schools of Islamic Tradition
The majority of Muslims are of the Sunni tradition, while 10-15% are Shiite. This
difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In
South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The puritanical Sunni sect of Wahhabism has played an
important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18th Century movement
founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab that preached a literal interpretation of the
Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship
between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty.7 Sufism is another more “mystical” variant
of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia.
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8 This argument is drawn from Gregorian, pp. 39,50.
9 Jillian Schwedler,”Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobilizer?” SAIS Review, summer, 2001.
10 Steve Raymer, Living Faith: Inside the Muslim World of Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Asia
Images Group, 2001).
11 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
(continued...)
The decline of Islamic power in the wake of European colonial expansion provoked
two key schools of thought within Islam that continue to have relevance today. The
traditionalist school believed that the cause for the decline of Islam could be traced to
“moral laxity and departure from the true path of Islam.” As a result, their response was
to call for an Islamic revival. Others, known as reformers, felt that the decline was due to
“a chronic failure to modernize their societies and institutions.” The path of the reformers
presents the question of whether it is possible to modernize without Westernizing. At its
core this is a struggle over values: “... how to protect a society’s cultural heritage and
traditional practices in an age of globalization and how to develop a creative coexistence
between modernization and traditionalism without Westernization.”8
It is thought by some analysts that if the United States and the West seek to make
common cause with moderate elements within the Islamic world against violent
extremists they would be well advised to do so in a way that is not perceived to be a threat
to the Islamic world. The United States, through its association with globalization and a
globalizing culture, is perceived as a threat by many leaders of the Islamic world who are
seeking to preserve, or restore, traditional culture even as segments of the populations
they lead are drawn to American culture. The disconnect between Muslim elites and their
people in Asia can also be seen in the decreasing popularity of United States’s foreign
policy even as regional leaders seek to maintain close ties. Some analysts believe that as
long as the Muslim world views the U.S.-led war against terror as a war against Islam
there will be significant limits on the extent to which Muslim states will be able to
cooperate with the United States in the war against terror. The problem is exacerbated by
widespread Muslim opposition to United States policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Islamic Revival, Political Islam, Extremists, and Terrorists
The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. The distinction
to be drawn is between revivalists, who see religious change as an end in itself, and
political Islam, or Islamists, who seek the Islamic revival as a means to the end of
transforming the state.9 A further distinction is to be drawn between those who would
work through the political process and those who would use violence to achieve their
ends. The Islamic revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in Asia.
While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process
of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by
links to the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Some Southeast Asians returning
from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new,
radical, militant, Islamist, and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-
American or anti-Western in character.10 There is also a significant number of violent
extremists of returned Southeast Asians, and a larger number of South Asians, who had
participated in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.11 Some of the South and
CRS-4
11 (...continued)
Publishers, 2003), p. 10.
12 Hefner, p.354.
13 See CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, A. Kronstadt and B. Vaughn, CRS Report
RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background, Febe Armanios and Alex Perry,
“Deadly Cargo,” Time Asia, October 21, 2003.
14 CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Mark Manyin, Steven Rogers, “Beyond
(continued...)
Southeast Asians who have been radicalized through these experiences have gone on to
spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups
who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely
opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective “the most effective policies
towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather
than against, the Muslim majority’s aspirations for social and economic improvement.”12
Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organizations in South Asia
appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from
closer interaction with the Middle East, strengthened recently by the presence of Al Qaeda
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and
in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was
crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni
extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-
Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite
conflict. An extensive array of Islamic schools known as madrassas, including some that
teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition
of Islamist political parties controls approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan’s
legislature, as well as the Northwest Frontier Province. They also lead a coalition in
Baluchistan. It has been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the
fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh
veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical
madrassas in Bangladesh. In India, while there exists significant inter-communal strife
between Hindus and Muslims it is largely domestically focused with the exception of
Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir.13
There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either
direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
and Abu Sayyaf are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology,
secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The
terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate
across much of Southeast Asia and establish Islamic law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In
Indonesia, the now reportedly disbanded Lashkar Jihad incited inter-communal strife
between Muslims and Christians in Sulawezi and the Moluccas that created a struggle that
can be exploited by terrorist groups such as JI. Lashkar Jundullah is another group that
has been involved in inter-communal violence in the Moluccas and Sulawezi. The
extremist Kampulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) is an example of an organization in
Southeast Asia established by veterans of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In
Thailand, separatists have mounted an insurrection in the Muslim southern provinces.14
CRS-5
14 (...continued)
the Abu Sayyaf,” Foreign Affairs, January, 2004, Rabasa, pp. 63-64 & Zachary Abuza, p.124.
15 See CRS Report RS20476, China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Developments and
U.S. Interests, September 28, 2001, by Kara Wortman and Kerry Dumbaugh.
16 Greg Fealy, “Understanding Political Islam in Southeast Asia,” Asian Social Issues Program,
Asia Society, New York, May, 21, 2003.
17 Karen Fragala, “Understanding Islam,” Newsweek, October 29, 2001.
18 The Stanley Foundation, “Political Islam and Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia: An Agenda
for U.S. Policy,” Policy Bulletin, October 16, 2003.
19 May 5, 2004 Asia Source interview of Mahmood Mamdani, author of Good Muslim, Bad
Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2004).
The relatively few Muslims of Northeast Asia are found in China for the most part.
China is home to an estimated 17.5 to 36 million Muslims. The largest, most concentrated
group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has
experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy
within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected
to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province.15
The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious
fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in
violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself
more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily
expressing itself politically.16 Karen Armstrong, author of Islam: A Short History, believes
that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better
appreciation of Islam in the West.17 It has been observed that U.S. counter-terrorism
policy “tends to conflate political Islam and terrorism worldwide.”18 A key distinction for
some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political
identity. An Islamic revival that finds its expression through cultural or religious means
is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their
anti-American or anti-Western ends. 19
An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and
Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist or extremist parties have not demonstrated
broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some
segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist
Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral setbacks in the 2004 elections
to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who
is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties, such as
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda
but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties
clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core
value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce
strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a
distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on sub-national, national
and regional objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the
international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda.
CRS-6
20 Abuza, pp. 13-14, Hefner, p.386, Gregorian, p. 68 & “... the jihadi groups draw their strength
from a common pool of self-righteous anger at what they see as the humiliation of Muslims at
the hands of the West ... the passion that fuels Islamist terror is growing. The main reason for this
is the perception, widespread in the Muslim world, that America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
along with its support for Israel, are tantamount to a war on Islam.” “Al-Qaeda: Amorphous but
Alive,” The Economist, June 5, 2004.
Sulawesi
(Celebes)
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 8/2/04)
Alienation and humiliation appear to be key concepts for understanding the Islamic
resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups.
In discussing madrassas and pesantren in Indonesia, from which extremists have been
recruited, Zachary Abuza has taken the position that the “radical fringe (of Islam) will
continue to grow, as modernization leaves people more isolated and the political process
leaves people more disenfranchised. The Islamists and their supporters will continue to
gain in power unless the more secular Muslim community again provides a successful
model of tolerant and modernist Islam that it has done fairly successfully for forty years.”
In this way, some analysts believe frustration from diminished expectations driven by
economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation
are at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by
some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to “respond
to mainstream Muslims’ hopes for economic improvement and political participation ...
education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace” that will
give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some
observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict
room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from
the societies within which they operate. 20